Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution calls on Congress to exercise the Article V process and call a constitutional convention to propose a "Fiscal Responsibility" amendment, asserting that sufficient state applications exist to require such a call. It also says any amendment from that convention must be ratified by popular votes of State Convention delegates in 38 states, rather than by state legislatures. The text creates a 60-day exception if the House Clerk issues a report finding there never were unrescinded applications from two-thirds of the states. It directs that a copy be sent to the Administrator of General Services for transmission to the state legislatures.
As a concurrent resolution, it would need approval by both the House and the Senate but is not presented to the President and does not by itself become law. The resolution includes a built-in 60-day window tied to a House Clerk report that could block the call if it finds no qualifying state applications, and it instructs transmittal to the states via the Administrator of General Services.
This concurrent resolution calls on Congress to convene an Article V Convention to propose a "Fiscal Responsibility Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution, unless a House Clerk report within 60 days shows fewer than two‑thirds of state applications.
It requires any amendment from that convention to be ratified by a vote of the people in conventions in three‑quarters (38) of the states, and directs transmission of the resolution to the Administrator of General Services for state legislatures.
Controversial, constitutionally complex proposal with disputed factual predicates and high potential for legal and political opposition.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this concurrent resolution functions as an agenda-setting instrument that clearly states the objective of calling an Article V convention for a Fiscal Responsibility Amendment and takes a few procedural steps (call, exception clause, transmission to GSA). It lacks thorough operational detail, fiscal acknowledgement, and clear drafting in key provisions.
Progressive fears cuts to social programs; conservatives favor fiscal limits.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Progressive fears cuts to social programs; conservatives favor fiscal limits.
Skeptical and likely opposed.
The persona would view a fiscal‑responsibility amendment as a potential vehicle for cutting Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal programs.
They would also worry about an open-ended Article V convention becoming a pathway for other, unrelated constitutional changes.
Ambivalent and cautious.
The persona recognizes legitimate concerns about rising federal debt and the value of public involvement, but worries about legal ambiguity, the counting of state applications, and unintended consequences from an Article V convention.
Generally supportive.
The persona would welcome a state‑driven Article V path to impose fiscal limits, such as a balanced‑budget amendment, and prefers popular ratification to ensure public legitimacy and bypass what they see as congressional inaction.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Controversial, constitutionally complex proposal with disputed factual predicates and high potential for legal and political opposition.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Progressive fears cuts to social programs; conservatives favor fiscal limits.
Controversial, constitutionally complex proposal with disputed factual predicates and high potential for legal and political opposition.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this concurrent resolution functions as an agenda-setting instrument that clearly states the objective of calling an Article V convention for a Fiscal Responsibility Amendment…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.