Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution proposes an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would require a balanced federal budget; it does not change law by itself. If Congress approves the proposal and three-fourths of the state legislatures ratify it within seven years, the amendment would become part of the Constitution. The amendment text would require Congress to balance expenditures and receipts within ten years, exclude debt payments and borrowing from the balance calculation, and allow two-thirds of each chamber to authorize temporary emergency spending.
A constitutional amendment must be approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate, is not sent to the President, and only becomes part of the Constitution if three-fourths of state legislatures ratify it within seven years.
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would require the federal government’s expenditures and receipts to be balanced, allowing the balance to be achieved over more than one year.
Expenditures would include all federal spending except payments on the public debt, and receipts would include all federal revenue except amounts derived from new borrowing.
Congress would be required to achieve balance within ten years after ratification.
On content alone this is a high-impact, high-salience constitutional change that historically has struggled to clear the supermajority thresholds required in both chambers and then secure ratification by three-fourths of states. Its concise text and some compromise features slightly improve plausibility, but the major institutional and policy hurdles make ultimate ratification unlikely absent unusually broad bipartisan consensus or major shifts in political alignment.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill clearly states a constitutional rule requiring balanced expenditures and receipts, includes narrow definitional choices and timetables, and supplies a supermajority emergency override. However, it lacks the detailed mechanisms, definitions, enforcement provisions, and implementation guidance one would reasonably expect for a constitutional amendment that restructures federal fiscal obligations.
Liberals worry the amendment would force cuts to social programs and hinder countercyclical policy; conservatives view it as necessary fiscal discipline.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Liberals worry the amendment would force cuts to social programs and hinder countercyclical policy; conservatives view it as necessary fiscal discipline.
A mainstream liberal/left-leaning observer would likely oppose the amendment or be skeptical.
They would view it as a rigid fiscal constraint that could force cuts to social programs, reduce the federal government's ability to respond to recessions, and prioritize short-term balance over investments in climate, health, and equity.
They would note the emergency two-thirds carve-out but question whether it is sufficient and worry about how the amendment would be interpreted and enforced.
A centrist/moderate would approach the amendment with cautious ambivalence.
They would appreciate the goal of fiscal responsibility and the ten-year phase-in, but worry about the amendment’s rigidity, ambiguities, and potential unintended consequences for economic management.
They would focus on technical details — definitions, enforcement, and practical fiscal effects — and seek clarifying language or safeguards that preserve flexibility for recessions and emergencies.
A mainstream conservative would generally favor the amendment’s core goal of forcing balance and restraining deficit spending.
They would see it as a constitutional check on federal fiscal expansion and a tool to discipline Congress.
Some conservatives might want even stronger or more immediate constraints, and others may be concerned that the multi-year balancing and the emergency two-thirds exception leave loopholes; overall they would be broadly supportive but attentive to enforcement details.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone this is a high-impact, high-salience constitutional change that historically has struggled to clear the supermajority thresholds required in both chambers and then secure ratification by three-fourths of states. Its concise text and some compromise features slightly improve plausibility, but the major institutional and policy hurdles make ultimate ratification unlikely absent unusually broad bipartisan consensus or major shifts in political alignment.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Liberals worry the amendment would force cuts to social programs and hinder countercyclical policy; conservatives view it as necessary fisc…
On content alone this is a high-impact, high-salience constitutional change that historically has struggled to clear the supermajority thre…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill clearly states a constitutional rule requiring balanced expenditures and receipts, includes narrow definitional choices and timetables, and supplies a supermajority e…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.