Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution proposes a change to the U.S. Constitution that would require the federal government to balance its annual budget unless two-thirds of each House approve a specific excess. If both chambers of Congress approve this joint resolution by the required majorities, it would be sent to the states and would become part of the Constitution only if three-fourths of state legislatures ratify it within seven years. The amendment would require the President to submit a budget with outlays not exceeding receipts and allows Congress to enforce the amendment by law using budget and revenue estimates. The amendment would take effect beginning in the fifth fiscal year after ratification.
As a proposed constitutional amendment, it must be approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate and then be ratified by three-fourths of the states within seven years; it is not sent to the President and does not become part of the Constitution unless the states ratify it.
This joint resolution proposes a Constitutional amendment requiring total federal outlays in any fiscal year not to exceed total federal receipts that year, except when a two-thirds vote of each House authorizes a specific excess.
The President must submit a proposed balanced budget each year.
Congress would implement the amendment by law, may rely on estimates, and receipts exclude borrowing while outlays exclude debt principal repayment.
Sweeping constitutional change with major fiscal consequences and no emergency carve-outs; requires supermajorities and three-fourths state ratification, historically unlikely.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill functions as a substantive constitutional amendment that sets a clear high-level rule (balanced budget requirement), provides some procedural markers (presidential budget submission, two-thirds exception, effective date), and leaves the detailed mechanics to future implementing legislation.
Liberals stress risks to automatic stabilizers and programs
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Liberals stress risks to automatic stabilizers and programs
Likely opposed.
The amendment would rigidly constrain annual deficits and limit automatic stabilizers and emergency fiscal responses.
It risks cuts to social programs or pressure to raise revenue during downturns.
Mixed view.
Appreciates aims for fiscal responsibility but worries the constitutional rule is inflexible and could hamper emergency or investment spending.
Would seek clearer legislative implementation and escape clauses.
Generally supportive.
Sees the amendment as a structural fix to chronic deficits and a constitutional restraint on federal spending.
May push for prompt enactment and strict enforcement.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Sweeping constitutional change with major fiscal consequences and no emergency carve-outs; requires supermajorities and three-fourths state ratification, historically unlikely.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Liberals stress risks to automatic stabilizers and programs
Sweeping constitutional change with major fiscal consequences and no emergency carve-outs; requires supermajorities and three-fourths state…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill functions as a substantive constitutional amendment that sets a clear high-level rule (balanced budget requirement), provides some procedural markers (presidential bu…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.