Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would require the federal government to balance its budget each year and cap spending at 18 percent of GDP unless supermajorities in Congress approve specific exceptions. It would also raise the vote thresholds for tax increases and debt-limit increases, require the President to submit a budget that meets those limits, and allow limited wartime or emergency waivers. To become part of the Constitution, the amendment must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states; if ratified it would take effect beginning with the fifth fiscal year after ratification. Until state ratification is complete, the text is only a proposal and has no legal force.
As a proposed constitutional amendment, it must be approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate in Congress and then be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures; it does not require the President's signature. After ratification by the required number of states, the amendment would become part of the Constitution.
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment requiring that federal outlays in any fiscal year not exceed receipts and not exceed 18% of GDP, subject to supermajority waivers.
It raises thresholds for revenue increases (two-thirds of each House) and for raising the debt limit (three-fifths), limits judicial authority to order revenue increases, requires the President to submit a compliant budget, and becomes effective in the fifth fiscal year after ratification.
As a broad constitutional fiscal rewrite with high political salience and substantial fiscal constraints, it faces steep supermajority and ratification barriers.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a clear and detailed constitutional framework to constrain federal fiscal policy, with specific numeric limits and vote thresholds. It specifies many operational rules but defers several implementation and edge-case matters to future legislation.
Liberty-left emphasizes social safety net and emergency flexibility risks.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Liberty-left emphasizes social safety net and emergency flexibility risks.
Views the amendment as a major structural fiscal constraint that risks cutting social programs and limiting government response to crises.
Concern centers on the 18% GDP cap, higher tax thresholds, and limited waiver scope for emergencies; some impacts are speculative.
Balances support for fiscal responsibility with worry about constitutional rigidity and economic flexibility.
Sees merit in discipline but seeks clearer emergency exceptions and pragmatic implementation details; many impacts depend on future legislation and estimates.
Generally favorable because the amendment enshrines balanced-budget and debt restraint, and makes tax increases harder.
Views it as a constitutional check on government size and deficit spending, though some may want even stricter limits.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
As a broad constitutional fiscal rewrite with high political salience and substantial fiscal constraints, it faces steep supermajority and ratification barriers.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Liberty-left emphasizes social safety net and emergency flexibility risks.
As a broad constitutional fiscal rewrite with high political salience and substantial fiscal constraints, it faces steep supermajority and…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a clear and detailed constitutional framework to constrain federal fiscal policy, with specific numeric limits and vote thresholds. It specifies many operati…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.