Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution proposes a constitutional amendment to give the President the power to reduce specific spending amounts in bills Congress sends to the President. If adopted by Congress and then ratified by three-fourths of the states within seven years, the amendment would let the President sign a bill but cut or reduce particular appropriations. The President must notify both Houses within ten days of any reduction, and Congress can restore the original amount only if two-thirds of each House vote to disapprove the President's reduction. The proposal itself does not become part of the Constitution unless the required number of state legislatures ratify it.
As a proposed constitutional amendment, it must be approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate and then be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures within seven years; it is not sent to the President for signature.
This joint resolution proposes a Constitutional amendment giving the President authority to reduce an appropriation in a bill or joint resolution at signature, after which the measure becomes law with the reduction incorporated.
The President must notify both Houses within 10 days; Congress may vote to disapprove the reduction, and if two-thirds of each House votes to disapprove, the appropriation amount reverts to the original.
The amendment would become effective if ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures within seven years.
High congressional supermajority thresholds and subsequent three-fourths state ratification make this constitutional amendment unlikely despite narrow fiscal focus.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a focused constitutional amendment that clearly articulates the principal change (granting a presidential reduction power on appropriations with a congressional override) and sets basic processes for notification and disapproval.
Executive power shift versus preserving Congress’s appropriations authority
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Executive power shift versus preserving Congress’s appropriations authority
Likely views the amendment as a significant transfer of spending power from Congress to the President, raising concerns about program stability and accountability.
May acknowledge potential to remove wasteful spending but sees substantial risks to social programs and legislative oversight without strict limits.
Pragmatic and cautious: sees potential for reducing waste and improving fiscal discipline, but worries about separation-of-powers effects and vague implementation.
Would support only with clear scope, transparency, and procedural safeguards.
Generally favorable: views amendment as a useful tool to restrain federal spending and eliminate pork.
Some caution about empowering a president from the opposing party, but overall support is strong if the power is clearly limited to appropriations reductions.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
High congressional supermajority thresholds and subsequent three-fourths state ratification make this constitutional amendment unlikely despite narrow fiscal focus.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Executive power shift versus preserving Congress’s appropriations authority
High congressional supermajority thresholds and subsequent three-fourths state ratification make this constitutional amendment unlikely des…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a focused constitutional amendment that clearly articulates the principal change (granting a presidential reduction power on appropriations with a congressio…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.