Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 125.
This resolution would withdraw the United States Congresss prior approval of the World Trade Organization Agreement that was given when Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. If passed by both chambers and signed by the President, it would formally remove that specific congressional approval from U.S. law. The text of the resolution only addresses withdrawing that approval and does not spell out any steps for international withdrawal, changes to treaty status, or how existing trade commitments would be handled. Any practical effects beyond removing the statutory approval would require further actions not contained in this text.
As a joint resolution, it must be approved by both the House and Senate and then presented to the President for signature to become law; the President could veto it, and a veto could be overridden only by the normal two-thirds vote in each chamber.
This joint resolution would withdraw Congress’s prior approval, given under section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The text simply states that Congress withdraws its approval of the WTO Agreement as defined in section 2(9) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
The resolution does not itself specify implementing steps or immediate legal mechanisms for effecting a U.S. exit or changing statutory trade law.
A terse revocation with sweeping effects, no compromise features, and large economic and diplomatic costs makes enactment unlikely.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise, single-statement statutory withdrawal of congressional approval for the WTO Agreement that references the URAA but offers very limited drafting detail or operational guidance.
Sovereignty/control versus economic stability and legal predictability.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Sovereignty/control versus economic stability and legal predictability.
Likely skeptical or opposed.
While some on the left historically critique the WTO for favoring corporate interests, mainstream progressives would worry about abrupt economic disruption.
They would prefer reform or stronger domestic protections rather than a simple withdrawal.
Generally opposed or wary.
Centrists will emphasize the economic and legal uncertainty from withdrawing approval and prefer pursuing reforms through negotiation and multilateral pressure.
They will stress the need for analysis and a managed process if any change is pursued.
Generally supportive.
Mainstream conservatives focused on national sovereignty and trade autonomy will view withdrawal as reclaiming U.S. policy space from international institutions.
They will see potential to impose tariffs and negotiate bilateral terms without WTO constraints.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
A terse revocation with sweeping effects, no compromise features, and large economic and diplomatic costs makes enactment unlikely.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Sovereignty/control versus economic stability and legal predictability.
A terse revocation with sweeping effects, no compromise features, and large economic and diplomatic costs makes enactment unlikely.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise, single-statement statutory withdrawal of congressional approval for the WTO Agreement that references the URAA but offers very limited drafting detail o…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.