Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This bill splits the current Ninth Circuit into a smaller "new Ninth" (California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands) and a new Twelfth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada). It reallocates judgeships (new Ninth 21, Twelfth 8), establishes Twelfth court locations, sets rules for assigning current active and senior judges, authorizes temporary additional appointments, and provides transition rules for pending cases.
Progressives see partisan motive; conservatives see administrative reform
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive statutory reorganization of the federal appellate structure that is drafted with considerable operational specificity and concrete amendments to title 28.
This bill splits the current Ninth Circuit into a smaller "new Ninth" (California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands) and a new Twelfth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada).
It reallocates judgeships (new Ninth 21, Twelfth 8), establishes Twelfth court locations, sets rules for assigning current active and senior judges, authorizes temporary additional appointments, and provides transition rules for pending cases.
The court reorganizing takes effect one year after enactment, with administrative wind‑down two years after the effective date, and authorizes necessary appropriations for implementation.
Technically detailed but politically consequential; requires Senate supermajority-level agreement and executive assent, making enactment unlikely absent broad compromise.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive statutory reorganization of the federal appellate structure that is drafted with considerable operational specificity and concrete amendments to title 28. It sets clear composition and judgeship counts, prescribes assignment and seniority mechanics, addresses pending cases, sets an effective date and administrative transition period, and authorizes funding.
Progressives see partisan motive; conservatives see administrative reform
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Progressives see partisan motive; conservatives see administrative reform
Likely skeptical and broadly opposed.
The persona would view the split as having the potential to reshape appellate outcomes and reduce the influence of a historically large, precedent‑setting Ninth Circuit.
Mixed view: acknowledges administrative benefits but worries about motive, cost, and implementation.
Support depends on evidence the split improves efficiency without undermining rule‑of‑law norms.
Likely supportive.
The persona would emphasize restoring local control, reducing dominance of an oversized circuit, and the opportunity to rebalance appellate outcomes in Mountain West and Southwest states.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Technically detailed but politically consequential; requires Senate supermajority-level agreement and executive assent, making enactment unlikely absent broad compromise.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Progressives see partisan motive; conservatives see administrative reform
Technically detailed but politically consequential; requires Senate supermajority-level agreement and executive assent, making enactment un…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive statutory reorganization of the federal appellate structure that is drafted with considerable operational specificity and concrete amendments to titl…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.