Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 201.
The bill amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to change FDIC Board composition and service limits. It requires four presidentially appointed Board members (with Senate confirmation), including one with State bank supervisory experience and one with primary experience at depository institutions under $10 billion in assets.
Progressive objects to CFPB becoming non‑voting observer; conservatives welcome reduced CFPB power
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a focused administrative/operational statutory amendment that specifies new composition and tenure rules for the FDIC Board.
The bill amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to change FDIC Board composition and service limits.
It requires four presidentially appointed Board members (with Senate confirmation), including one with State bank supervisory experience and one with primary experience at depository institutions under $10 billion in assets.
The Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) would serve as a non‑voting observer on the FDIC Board.
Technically narrow and low-cost, but politically sensitive governance changes and removal of a voting role for the CFPB Director reduce the chance of enactment absent broad compromise.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a focused administrative/operational statutory amendment that specifies new composition and tenure rules for the FDIC Board. It provides clear substantive changes to statutory language but omits several implementation and definitional details typical for governance reforms.
Progressive objects to CFPB becoming non‑voting observer; conservatives welcome reduced CFPB power
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Progressive objects to CFPB becoming non‑voting observer; conservatives welcome reduced CFPB power
Likely wary.
The liberal view would welcome term limits and inclusion of state/community bank experience but worry that making the CFPB Director a non‑voting observer weakens consumer protection influence.
They may also be concerned that the small‑bank focus could reduce regulatory emphasis on large bank risks.
Pragmatic and mixed.
Centrists would see positive accountability effects from term limits and value adding small and state supervisory perspectives, while cautioning about reduced formal CFPB influence and potential ambiguity in eligibility language.
Generally supportive.
Conservatives would favor stronger representation for state supervisors and community banks, welcome limits on long tenure, and view the CFPB Director's non‑voting observer role as appropriate to prevent regulatory overreach.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Technically narrow and low-cost, but politically sensitive governance changes and removal of a voting role for the CFPB Director reduce the chance of enactment absent broad compromise.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Progressive objects to CFPB becoming non‑voting observer; conservatives welcome reduced CFPB power
Technically narrow and low-cost, but politically sensitive governance changes and removal of a voting role for the CFPB Director reduce the…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a focused administrative/operational statutory amendment that specifies new composition and tenure rules for the FDIC Board. It provides clear substantive changes…
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