Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This proposed constitutional amendment would cap total Federal debt (public plus intragovernmental) at 130% of GDP the first fiscal year it applies, then reduce the cap by 1 percentage point per year until it reaches 120% of GDP. Exceeding the cap requires a roll-call three-fifths vote of each House each fiscal year for a specific, enumerated excess.
Left emphasizes harm to social programs and crisis response flexibility.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clearly defined constitutional policy proposal that sets numeric debt limits, a phased schedule, and specified exceptions while delegating considerable implementation detail to future congressional legislation.
This proposed constitutional amendment would cap total Federal debt (public plus intragovernmental) at 130% of GDP the first fiscal year it applies, then reduce the cap by 1 percentage point per year until it reaches 120% of GDP.
Exceeding the cap requires a roll-call three-fifths vote of each House each fiscal year for a specific, enumerated excess.
The President must submit a budget showing total debt within the cap for that year and the next five years.
Constitutional amendments are rare; this would need supermajorities in Congress and ratification by three-fourths of states, making enactment unlikely.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clearly defined constitutional policy proposal that sets numeric debt limits, a phased schedule, and specified exceptions while delegating considerable implementation detail to future congressional legislation.
Left emphasizes harm to social programs and crisis response flexibility.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Left emphasizes harm to social programs and crisis response flexibility.
Likely skeptical: the amendment constitutionally restricts fiscal flexibility and counts intragovernmental debt, limiting policy options.
It risks forcing spending cuts or tax measures that reduce social programs, especially during downturns or disasters.
Mixed view: supports fiscal responsibility but cautious about reducing constitutional flexibility.
Sees advantage in transparency and multi-year budgeting, but worries about operational and economic risks and narrow waiver scope.
Generally supportive: sees constitutional cap as a strong tool for fiscal restraint and preventing future debt escalation.
Prefers binding limits and supermajority requirement for exceptions.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Constitutional amendments are rare; this would need supermajorities in Congress and ratification by three-fourths of states, making enactment unlikely.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Left emphasizes harm to social programs and crisis response flexibility.
Constitutional amendments are rare; this would need supermajorities in Congress and ratification by three-fourths of states, making enactme…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clearly defined constitutional policy proposal that sets numeric debt limits, a phased schedule, and specified exceptions while delegating considerable implement…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.