- Federal agenciesClarifies and distinguishes a gratuities offense from other bribery and theft statutes, giving prosecutors and courts c…
- Potential benefitBy setting monetary thresholds ($1,000 gratuity; $5,000 transactional nexus), the bill focuses enforcement on larger-va…
- Potential benefitEstablishing a separate offense with a maximum 2-year imprisonment exposure for gratuities could be presented as a more…
No Gratuities for Governing Act of 2025
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
This bill amends 18 U.S.C. §666 (crimes related to theft, bribery, and gratuities involving programs that receive Federal funds). It renumbers subsections, adds a new subsection making it a federal offense to give or receive gratuities of $1,000 or more tied to an official act connected to organizational or government transactions valued at $5,000 or more, and sets a penalty of up to 2 years imprisonment (and fines) for that gratuity offense.
Whether federal criminal law should be used to police gratuities tied to federally funded programs (liberal/centrist accept targeted federal role; conservatives prefer state/civil remedies).
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive criminal-law amendment that clearly identifies its target and purpose and includes some concrete elements (dollar thresholds, mens rea, penalties).
This bill amends 18 U.S.C. §666 (crimes related to theft, bribery, and gratuities involving programs that receive Federal funds).
It renumbers subsections, adds a new subsection making it a federal offense to give or receive gratuities of $1,000 or more tied to an official act connected to organizational or government transactions valued at $5,000 or more, and sets a penalty of up to 2 years imprisonment (and fines) for that gratuity offense.
The bill also contains technical edits to cross-references and appears to change language and penalties in existing subsections (the text as provided is partially ambiguous about an adjustment from 10 to 15 years in a different subsection).
On content alone, this is a focused, technocratic amendment to an existing federal anti-corruption statute that does not create large new spending or controversial policy shifts. It includes limiting thresholds and modest penalties, which are features that typically help bipartisan coalitions. The main obstacles are standard legislative process frictions (committee consideration, floor scheduling, Senate procedure) and any pushback on federal criminal jurisdiction over state/local actors. Absent strong opposition, such bills have a reasonable chance, especially if incorporated into broader legislative vehicles.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive criminal-law amendment that clearly identifies its target and purpose and includes some concrete elements (dollar thresholds, mens rea, penalties). However, the statutory-edit language contains drafting irregularities and fragments that undermine clarity and raise the risk of ambiguous interpretation.
Whether federal criminal law should be used to police gratuities tied to federally funded programs (liberal/centrist accept targeted federal role; conservatives prefer state/civil remedies).
Who stands to gain, and who may push back.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
- Federal agenciesOrganizations and government agencies that receive federal funds may face added compliance costs and administrative bur…
- Potential burdenThe new criminal prohibition could chill routine interactions, fundraising, or legitimate gifts between private parties…
- Local governmentsCritics may contend the expansion of federal criminal law to cover gratuities involving state, local, and tribal agents…
Why the argument around this bill splits.
Whether federal criminal law should be used to police gratuities tied to federally funded programs (liberal/centrist accept targeted federal role; conservatives prefer state/civil remedies).
A mainstream liberal would likely view the bill positively as a targeted anti-corruption measure that clarifies and tightens criminal liability for improper gratuities tied to programs receiving federal funds.
They would appreciate the clear monetary thresholds ($1,000 / $5,000) and a specific federal backstop for protecting federally funded programs from pay-to-play behavior.
At the same time, they might worry about overcriminalization of lower-level or inadvertent gift practices and would want protections against selective enforcement and safeguards for whistleblowers and transparency.
A pragmatic moderate would see the bill as a reasonable, targeted measure to curb corruption in federally funded programs but would be cautious about federal overreach and ambiguity.
They would welcome the numeric thresholds as helpful for clarity but would want a fiscal and legal impact assessment, clearer drafting on renumbering and penalty changes, and assurances that the law will not duplicate existing statutes or create unforeseen enforcement burdens.
The centrist stance is cautiously favorable if technical fixes and oversight provisions are added.
A mainstream conservative would be skeptical of expanding federal criminal law into the conduct of state, local, tribal, and nonprofit actors, viewing this as potential federal overreach.
While opposing corruption in principle, this persona would prefer state enforcement, civil remedies, or narrower federal standards and would be concerned that the bill criminalizes ordinary interactions and increases the risk of politicized prosecutions.
They would likely oppose the bill unless substantially narrowed and reoriented toward civil penalties or state-level enforcement incentives.
The path through Congress.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone, this is a focused, technocratic amendment to an existing federal anti-corruption statute that does not create large new spending or controversial policy shifts. It includes limiting thresholds and modest penalties, which are features that typically help bipartisan coalitions. The main obstacles are standard legislative process frictions (committee consideration, floor scheduling, Senate procedure) and any pushback on federal criminal jurisdiction over state/local actors. Absent strong opposition, such bills have a reasonable chance, especially if incorporated into broader legislative vehicles.
- The provided bill text contains some redacted or syntactically unclear replacement lines (cross-reference and penalty edits), so exact changes to sentencing and cross-references are not fully unambiguous from the text provided.
- No cost estimate (e.g., CBO) or Administration/DOJ views are included; the level of executive-branch support or opposition could materially affect momentum.
Recent votes on the bill.
No vote history yet
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Go deeper than the headline read.
Whether federal criminal law should be used to police gratuities tied to federally funded programs (liberal/centrist accept targeted federa…
On content alone, this is a focused, technocratic amendment to an existing federal anti-corruption statute that does not create large new s…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive criminal-law amendment that clearly identifies its target and purpose and includes some concrete elements (dollar thresholds, mens rea, penalties). H…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.