Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
The Power of the Mint Act amends the Federal Reserve Act and Title 31 of the U.S. Code to prohibit the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury from issuing or directing the issuance of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) without express authorization from Congress. The bill defines a CBDC as a form of digital money or monetary value denominated in the national unit of account that is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve (or central bank).
Privacy vs. inclusion: Leftists worry the ban could block inclusion benefits; conservatives emphasize privacy and limiting state power.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise statutory prohibition inserted into existing law that clearly defines its primary target (central bank digital currency) and the actors affected.
The Power of the Mint Act amends the Federal Reserve Act and Title 31 of the U.S. Code to prohibit the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury from issuing or directing the issuance of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) without express authorization from Congress.
The bill defines a CBDC as a form of digital money or monetary value denominated in the national unit of account that is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve (or central bank).
The findings cite Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution (Congressional power to coin money) and the Federal Reserve Act (the Fed as fiscal agent) as rationale.
On content alone, the bill is legally targeted, low-cost, and administratively simple — features that aid legislative traction. Nevertheless, it touches on contested institutional and monetary-policy territory, lacks compromise mechanisms (sunset or pilots), and would require explicit Congressional authorization to be overridden, making it more politically charged. These factors make enactment plausible in a receptive chamber but substantially less likely without cross‑chamber agreement and broader bipartisan buy‑in.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise statutory prohibition inserted into existing law that clearly defines its primary target (central bank digital currency) and the actors affected. It directly amends specified provisions of the U.S. Code to achieve that outcome.
Privacy vs. inclusion: Leftists worry the ban could block inclusion benefits; conservatives emphasize privacy and limiting state power.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Privacy vs. inclusion: Leftists worry the ban could block inclusion benefits; conservatives emphasize privacy and limiting state power.
A mainstream progressive would approach this bill with mixed views.
They may appreciate the emphasis on democratic oversight and constitutional limits on executive or administrative action, and share concerns about surveillance, civil liberties, and equitable access.
At the same time they could be concerned that an across-the-board prohibition without clear safeguards or pilot authority might block potential benefits of CBDCs for financial inclusion, lower-cost payments, and improved delivery of public benefits.
A pragmatic moderate would see this bill as a reasonable assertion of Congress’s constitutional role and a mechanism to ensure democratic deliberation before a potentially consequential monetary innovation.
They would welcome constraints on executive or agency unilateralism but worry the bill could slow useful modernization of the payments system or leave policy to ad hoc politics.
Overall, they are inclined to support the bill’s requirement for explicit congressional authorization while favoring well-scoped legislative language to avoid unintended consequences.
A mainstream conservative would likely view the bill favorably as a protective measure against expanded federal control over money and individual transactions.
They would welcome the reinforcement of Congress’s constitutional prerogative and the prevention of a Fed- or Treasury-driven CBDC that could enable administrative levers over private economic activity.
Conservatives would see this as preserving individual liberty, limiting government overreach, and protecting the role of private banking and state-level functions in payments.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone, the bill is legally targeted, low-cost, and administratively simple — features that aid legislative traction. Nevertheless, it touches on contested institutional and monetary-policy territory, lacks compromise mechanisms (sunset or pilots), and would require explicit Congressional authorization to be overridden, making it more politically charged. These factors make enactment plausible in a receptive chamber but substantially less likely without cross‑chamber agreement and broader bipartisan buy‑in.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Privacy vs. inclusion: Leftists worry the ban could block inclusion benefits; conservatives emphasize privacy and limiting state power.
On content alone, the bill is legally targeted, low-cost, and administratively simple — features that aid legislative traction. Nevertheles…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise statutory prohibition inserted into existing law that clearly defines its primary target (central bank digital currency) and the actors affected. It dire…
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