- Potential benefitEnhances national security and data-protection by reducing use of LiDAR systems from specified foreign adversaries, pot…
- Potential benefitShifts procurement demand toward domestic or allied LiDAR suppliers, which supporters may argue could create or preserv…
- Federal agenciesEnsures federal grants and loans administered by DOT are not spent on covered foreign-made LiDAR, aligning federal fund…
Securing Infrastructure from Adversaries Act of 2025
Referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
This bill (Securing Infrastructure from Adversaries Act of 2025) prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from procuring or obtaining LiDAR technology that is produced in or provided by a "covered foreign country," a "covered LiDAR company," or otherwise meets the definitions in a cross-referenced provision of the FY2025 NDAA. It bars the Department from entering into, extending, or renewing contracts with entities that use such covered LiDAR unless the entity certifies it will not use the covered technology, and it prevents Department loan or grant funds from being obligated to procure or use covered LiDAR.
Scope and clarity of definitions: centrists and the left want narrow, clear definitions and transition support; conservatives want explicit targeting of adversaries but fewer new procedural burdens.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill clearly establishes a substantive prohibition on procurement and use of specified foreign-made LiDAR by entities receiving DOT contracts, grants, or loans, and it includes basic implementation elements (definitions by reference, certification requirement, waiver procedure, exceptions, and an effective date).
This bill (Securing Infrastructure from Adversaries Act of 2025) prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from procuring or obtaining LiDAR technology that is produced in or provided by a "covered foreign country," a "covered LiDAR company," or otherwise meets the definitions in a cross-referenced provision of the FY2025 NDAA.
It bars the Department from entering into, extending, or renewing contracts with entities that use such covered LiDAR unless the entity certifies it will not use the covered technology, and it prevents Department loan or grant funds from being obligated to procure or use covered LiDAR.
The Secretary may grant a case-by-case waiver if the Secretary certifies to two Congressional committees at least 15 days before the activity is carried out that the waiver is in the national interest.
On content alone the bill is plausible to advance because it is narrow, administratively implementable, fiscally restrained, and framed as a national security/procurement safeguard — features that often win cross‑aisle support. However, potential industry pushback, concerns about trade implications, reliance on externally defined ‘‘covered’’ entities, and the Senate's higher threshold for consensus reduce its straightforwardness; the waiver and exceptions improve pragmatic acceptability but do not eliminate key uncertainties.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill clearly establishes a substantive prohibition on procurement and use of specified foreign-made LiDAR by entities receiving DOT contracts, grants, or loans, and it includes basic implementation elements (definitions by reference, certification requirement, waiver procedure, exceptions, and an effective date).
Scope and clarity of definitions: centrists and the left want narrow, clear definitions and transition support; conservatives want explicit targeting of adversaries but fewer new procedural burdens.
Who stands to gain, and who may push back.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
- Potential burdenReduces the pool of eligible LiDAR suppliers, which could raise procurement costs for DOT projects and for grant/loan r…
- Potential burdenMay cause project delays or supply-chain bottlenecks if covered foreign vendors currently supply a significant share of…
- Potential burdenImposes additional compliance and administrative burden on contractors and grant recipients required to certify nonuse…
Why the argument around this bill splits.
Scope and clarity of definitions: centrists and the left want narrow, clear definitions and transition support; conservatives want explicit targeting of adversaries but fewer new procedural burdens.
A mainstream progressive would view this as a national-security-minded supply-chain protection for critical infrastructure that could be acceptable in principle, but would be cautious about potential negative impacts on safety deployment and equity.
They would appreciate steps to prevent adversary access to sensitive infrastructure data and to promote domestic resilience, but worry the ban could raise costs, slow adoption of safety technologies, and disproportionately affect smaller jurisdictions and public agencies.
They would also look for assurances that civil liberties, privacy, and community safety goals are not undermined by reduced access to affordable LiDAR.
A pragmatic moderate would view the bill as a reasonable, targeted national-security measure with bipartisan potential, but would flag implementation details and cost tradeoffs as critical.
They would generally support protecting federal programs and infrastructure from potentially hostile foreign technology, while urging phased implementation, clearer definitions, and resources to avoid disrupting safety projects and state/local programs.
They would emphasize the need for cost-benefit analysis, operational clarity for contracting officers, and an effective waiver mechanism that balances security with practical necessities.
A mainstream conservative would generally favor measures that block technology from foreign adversaries and strengthen national security, but would scrutinize federal overreach, compliance burdens, and cost to taxpayers.
They may support the bill if it targets adversary states and helps protect critical infrastructure and U.S. sovereignty over sensitive sensing capabilities, while seeking to limit regulatory uncertainty and maintain efficient procurement.
They would also press for strong enforcement against foreign influence and prefer that the policy not create ongoing oversized federal bureaucratic burdens on contractors or state partners.
The path through Congress.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone the bill is plausible to advance because it is narrow, administratively implementable, fiscally restrained, and framed as a national security/procurement safeguard — features that often win cross‑aisle support. However, potential industry pushback, concerns about trade implications, reliance on externally defined ‘‘covered’’ entities, and the Senate's higher threshold for consensus reduce its straightforwardness; the waiver and exceptions improve pragmatic acceptability but do not eliminate key uncertainties.
- The bill references definitions in another statute (NDAA section 164(e)); which countries or companies are covered is not stated in this text, and the scope of coverage materially affects political support and industry impact.
- No cost estimate or formal assessment of procurement market impacts is included; unknowns about vendor availability and price differentials could drive opposition from agencies, states, or contractors.
Recent votes on the bill.
No vote history yet
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Go deeper than the headline read.
Scope and clarity of definitions: centrists and the left want narrow, clear definitions and transition support; conservatives want explicit…
On content alone the bill is plausible to advance because it is narrow, administratively implementable, fiscally restrained, and framed as…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill clearly establishes a substantive prohibition on procurement and use of specified foreign-made LiDAR by entities receiving DOT contracts, grants, or loans, and it inc…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.