Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
The bill adds a new Section 10 to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. It bars the FCC from granting licenses, U.S. market access, or earth station authorizations for geostationary or nongeostationary satellite systems, or authorizations to use individually licensed or blanket-licensed earth stations, when the licensee or controller is an entity that produces or provides a “covered communications equipment or service” or an affiliate.
Security vs economic impact: left worries about access, right prioritizes security
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive policy change that establishes a clear categorical prohibition and supplies helpful technical definitions, but it lacks a stated problem/purpose, detailed implementation procedures, fiscal acknowledgment, edge-case handling, and accountability mechanisms.
The bill adds a new Section 10 to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019.
It bars the FCC from granting licenses, U.S. market access, or earth station authorizations for geostationary or nongeostationary satellite systems, or authorizations to use individually licensed or blanket-licensed earth stations, when the licensee or controller is an entity that produces or provides a “covered communications equipment or service” or an affiliate.
Affiliate ownership is defined to include equity interests of 10 percent or more.
Targeted national-security regulation with low fiscal cost and precedents for bipartisan telecom-security laws raises plausibility; procedural hurdles and stakeholder opposition leave uncertainty.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive policy change that establishes a clear categorical prohibition and supplies helpful technical definitions, but it lacks a stated problem/purpose, detailed implementation procedures, fiscal acknowledgment, edge-case handling, and accountability mechanisms.
Security vs economic impact: left worries about access, right prioritizes security
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Security vs economic impact: left worries about access, right prioritizes security
Likely supportive of strengthening communications supply chain and national security protections, while wary of unintended access or affordability impacts.
Concerned the prohibition could slow deployment to underserved areas or raise costs if too broad.
Wants clear definitions and safety valves to protect public-interest connectivity.
Views the bill as a reasonable national-security measure that fills a gap for satellite infrastructure.
Supports FCC rulemaking but seeks narrowly tailored language, transition rules, and a transparent waiver or appeal process to limit economic disruption.
Likely strongly supportive because it restricts access by vendors seen as national-security risks.
Views this as closing a loophole that could let adversary-linked equipment access U.S. satellite markets.
May request narrowly drawn rules to avoid accidental impact on U.S. firms.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Targeted national-security regulation with low fiscal cost and precedents for bipartisan telecom-security laws raises plausibility; procedural hurdles and stakeholder opposition leave uncertainty.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Security vs economic impact: left worries about access, right prioritizes security
Targeted national-security regulation with low fiscal cost and precedents for bipartisan telecom-security laws raises plausibility; procedu…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a substantive policy change that establishes a clear categorical prohibition and supplies helpful technical definitions, but it lacks a stated problem/purpose, det…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.