Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
This bill (Wall Street Tax Act of 2025) creates a new federal tax on certain trading transactions in securities and derivatives (new chapter 36C of the Internal Revenue Code). The tax is levied as a percentage of the transaction value (fair market value for securities; payment amount for derivatives), phased in from 0.02% (2026) to 0.1% (2029 and after).
Revenue vs. market harm: Liberals emphasize revenue and curbing speculation; conservatives emphasize harm to liquidity and investors.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a well-specified statutory vehicle to create a new tax on trading transactions: it defines the tax, base, rates, scope, payer responsibilities, and integrates with existing IRC provisions while delegating detailed implementation and anti-avoidance mechanics to Treasury regulations.
This bill (Wall Street Tax Act of 2025) creates a new federal tax on certain trading transactions in securities and derivatives (new chapter 36C of the Internal Revenue Code).
The tax is levied as a percentage of the transaction value (fair market value for securities; payment amount for derivatives), phased in from 0.02% (2026) to 0.1% (2029 and after).
It applies to purchases that occur on or are subject to the rules of U.S. exchanges or involve U.S. persons, with the exchange or broker generally responsible for remitting the tax; certain initial issuances and limited short-term debt are excluded.
On content alone the bill is ambitious and impactful: a new broad financial transaction tax with complex definitions and cross-border reach. Historically, proposals that impose new broad taxes on financial transactions face concentrated industry opposition, require detailed regulatory implementation, and struggle to attract bipartisan support; while phased implementation and some carve-outs moderate impact, they are unlikely to offset core objections. As a result, the bill appears unlikely to become law unless substantially amended, packaged with offsetting concessions, or accompanied by unusual political conditions not evident from the text.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a well-specified statutory vehicle to create a new tax on trading transactions: it defines the tax, base, rates, scope, payer responsibilities, and integrates with existing IRC provisions while delegating detailed implementation and anti-avoidance mechanics to Treasury regulations.
Revenue vs. market harm: Liberals emphasize revenue and curbing speculation; conservatives emphasize harm to liquidity and investors.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Revenue vs. market harm: Liberals emphasize revenue and curbing speculation; conservatives emphasize harm to liquidity and investors.
This persona would likely view the bill positively as a modest financial transaction tax aimed at making the financial sector contribute more to federal revenues and discouraging high-frequency or speculative trading.
They would see the phased-in, small percentage rates as politically and administratively practical while still generating meaningful revenue if trading volumes remain high.
They would welcome the broad coverage (stocks, many forms of debt, and derivatives) as preventing easy loopholes.
This persona would take a cautious, pragmatic view: the tax could raise revenue and address some market behaviors, but the design and economic consequences merit careful review.
They would be attentive to potential impacts on liquidity, trading costs for pension funds and corporations, and relocation of trading activity offshore.
Thus they would neither embrace the bill wholeheartedly nor reject it outright; instead they would want empirical analysis (CBO/JCT scoring) and implementation details, plus possible technical fixes.
This persona would likely oppose the bill as harmful government intervention that increases costs for capital markets, risks driving trading activity offshore, and burdens investors and businesses.
They would emphasize that even a small percentage per transaction raises trading costs that ultimately reduce returns for savers, raise capital costs for firms, and impair market liquidity and price discovery.
They would also be concerned about expanded IRS administrative authority, broad derivative definitions, and potential unintended effects on normal commercial finance.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone the bill is ambitious and impactful: a new broad financial transaction tax with complex definitions and cross-border reach. Historically, proposals that impose new broad taxes on financial transactions face concentrated industry opposition, require detailed regulatory implementation, and struggle to attract bipartisan support; while phased implementation and some carve-outs moderate impact, they are unlikely to offset core objections. As a result, the bill appears unlikely to become law unless substantially amended, packaged with offsetting concessions, or accompanied by unusual political conditions not evident from the text.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Revenue vs. market harm: Liberals emphasize revenue and curbing speculation; conservatives emphasize harm to liquidity and investors.
On content alone the bill is ambitious and impactful: a new broad financial transaction tax with complex definitions and cross-border reach…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a well-specified statutory vehicle to create a new tax on trading transactions: it defines the tax, base, rates, scope, payer responsibilities, and integrates with…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.