Read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
The bill amends the National Security Act of 1947 by adding a new criminal offense (Section 1115) making it unlawful, within the United States, to access property that is both under the jurisdiction of an element of the intelligence community and clearly marked as closed or restricted. The statute applies to unauthorized access and sets graduated criminal penalties: for a first offense up to 180 days imprisonment (or a fine), for a second offense up to 3 years, and for a third or subsequent offense up to 10 years (and fines pursuant to title 18).
Progressives emphasize civil liberties and risks to protesters, journalists, and whistleblowers; conservatives emphasize national security and deterrence.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise substantive amendment that clearly establishes a new criminal prohibition and graduated penalties for unauthorized access to intelligence community property that is clearly marked as closed or restricted, and it includes a clerical table-of-contents amendment.
The bill amends the National Security Act of 1947 by adding a new criminal offense (Section 1115) making it unlawful, within the United States, to access property that is both under the jurisdiction of an element of the intelligence community and clearly marked as closed or restricted.
The statute applies to unauthorized access and sets graduated criminal penalties: for a first offense up to 180 days imprisonment (or a fine), for a second offense up to 3 years, and for a third or subsequent offense up to 10 years (and fines pursuant to title 18).
The bill also updates the Act’s table of contents to include the new section.
On content alone, a short, targeted criminal provision protecting intelligence-community property has a plausible path to enactment because it is limited in scope and low-cost. Offsetting that are civil-liberties concerns, definitional ambiguities, and the lack of compromise features (exceptions, intent requirements, or sunsets) that could provoke opposition or require amendment. The bill is neither transformative nor budgetary, which raises its baseline viability, but its ultimate fate would hinge on how quickly and acceptably those legal and rights-related issues are resolved in committee and on the floor.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise substantive amendment that clearly establishes a new criminal prohibition and graduated penalties for unauthorized access to intelligence community property that is clearly marked as closed or restricted, and it includes a clerical table-of-contents amendment.
Progressives emphasize civil liberties and risks to protesters, journalists, and whistleblowers; conservatives emphasize national security and deterrence.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Progressives emphasize civil liberties and risks to protesters, journalists, and whistleblowers; conservatives emphasize national security and deterrence.
A mainstream liberal would acknowledge the government’s interest in protecting sensitive intelligence facilities and personnel from unauthorized entry, but would be concerned about civil liberties and First Amendment implications if the law is applied too broadly.
They would worry that vaguely defined terms like “access,” “under the jurisdiction,” and “clearly marked” could be used to criminalize peaceful protesters, journalists, or whistleblowers near intelligence facilities.
They would also note the relatively severe escalating penalties (up to 10 years for repeat offenses) and seek stronger procedural safeguards and narrow tailoring.
A centrist/moderate would generally accept the government’s interest in protecting intelligence-community sites and see value in a statutory offense that aligns federal penalties with security needs.
They would, however, be cautious about clarity and proportionality and would look for precise drafting to avoid unintended consequences and unnecessary legal challenges.
Pragmatically, centrists would support the core idea if the bill included clearer definitions or implementation guidance and safeguards for legitimate public-interest activities.
A mainstream conservative would likely view the bill favorably as a reasonable measure to protect national security and deter trespass or hostile incursions on intelligence facilities.
They would appreciate clear criminal penalties, including escalated sentences for repeat offenders, and see the statute as filling a gap or reinforcing existing protections for sensitive government property.
Some conservatives might want even firmer language or broader scope, but most would endorse the bill’s approach to deterrence and enforcement.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone, a short, targeted criminal provision protecting intelligence-community property has a plausible path to enactment because it is limited in scope and low-cost. Offsetting that are civil-liberties concerns, definitional ambiguities, and the lack of compromise features (exceptions, intent requirements, or sunsets) that could provoke opposition or require amendment. The bill is neither transformative nor budgetary, which raises its baseline viability, but its ultimate fate would hinge on how quickly and acceptably those legal and rights-related issues are resolved in committee and on the floor.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Progressives emphasize civil liberties and risks to protesters, journalists, and whistleblowers; conservatives emphasize national security…
On content alone, a short, targeted criminal provision protecting intelligence-community property has a plausible path to enactment because…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a concise substantive amendment that clearly establishes a new criminal prohibition and graduated penalties for unauthorized access to intelligence community prope…
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