Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
The bill adds a new tax (section 59B) to the Internal Revenue Code that imposes an additional tax on Members of Congress, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner when there is a lapse in appropriations. The tax equals the 'applicable percentage' of the Member's 'applicable wages' (wages paid for services as a Member), where the applicable percentage is the fraction of days the Member served during lapse days in the taxable year divided by the total days the Member served during the taxable year.
Constitutionality: conservatives and centrists emphasize 27th Amendment/legal risks; liberals are more willing to accept litigation risk for accountability (disagreement on legal jeopardy).
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill establishes a clear substantive change by adding a new tax provision to the Internal Revenue Code with primary definitional elements and a calculable formula.
The bill adds a new tax (section 59B) to the Internal Revenue Code that imposes an additional tax on Members of Congress, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner when there is a lapse in appropriations.
The tax equals the 'applicable percentage' of the Member's 'applicable wages' (wages paid for services as a Member), where the applicable percentage is the fraction of days the Member served during lapse days in the taxable year divided by the total days the Member served during the taxable year.
A "lapse in appropriations" is defined broadly as any period when any regular appropriation bill or continuing resolution is not in effect for any federal agency or department.
Content-wise the bill is narrow, clear, and inexpensive, which normally helps passage; however, it imposes a direct, tangible penalty on the very group that must vote to enact it, and it contains no compromise mechanisms or sunset. Those features create a high structural barrier. While public appeal could be strong, internal legislative self-interest and potential constitutional or administrative questions reduce its chance of becoming law.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill establishes a clear substantive change by adding a new tax provision to the Internal Revenue Code with primary definitional elements and a calculable formula. It is moderately specific about the taxable base and the metric for apportioning the tax but leaves significant administrative, fiscal, and edge-case details unspecified.
Constitutionality: conservatives and centrists emphasize 27th Amendment/legal risks; liberals are more willing to accept litigation risk for accountability (disagreement on legal jeopardy).
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Constitutionality: conservatives and centrists emphasize 27th Amendment/legal risks; liberals are more willing to accept litigation risk for accountability (disagreement on legal jeopardy).
A mainstream liberal would likely view the bill as a modest accountability measure intended to increase political cost for lawmakers who allow funding lapses.
They would see it as better than nothing but insufficient to protect furloughed federal workers or to significantly deter shutdowns, since it taxes only a proportion of Members' wages rather than denying pay or imposing steeper penalties.
They may support it as a step toward stronger reforms if paired with protections for affected low-wage federal employees and clear enforcement.
A centrist would see the bill as a pragmatic attempt to change incentives for lawmakers and reduce the political benefit of causing shutdowns, but would be cautious about legal and practical effectiveness.
They would appreciate the automatic, neutral formula but worry about the small size of the penalty, ambiguity in definitions, and the risk of litigation.
A centrist would weigh the bill's symbolic value against legal risks and may prefer alternative mechanisms (e.g., withholding pay until appropriations passed) or additional clarity and fiscal analysis before full support.
A mainstream conservative would likely oppose the bill as an unnecessary, punitive tax imposed by Congress on its own members and might view it as performative grandstanding.
They would raise constitutional objections (especially the 27th Amendment prohibition on changing Congressional compensation) and argue the bill expands tax code intrusion into internal Congressional matters.
Some conservatives might prefer a simpler remedy (e.g., withholding pay until appropriations are enacted) rather than an additional tax.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
Content-wise the bill is narrow, clear, and inexpensive, which normally helps passage; however, it imposes a direct, tangible penalty on the very group that must vote to enact it, and it contains no compromise mechanisms or sunset. Those features create a high structural barrier. While public appeal could be strong, internal legislative self-interest and potential constitutional or administrative questions reduce its chance of becoming law.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Constitutionality: conservatives and centrists emphasize 27th Amendment/legal risks; liberals are more willing to accept litigation risk fo…
Content-wise the bill is narrow, clear, and inexpensive, which normally helps passage; however, it imposes a direct, tangible penalty on th…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill establishes a clear substantive change by adding a new tax provision to the Internal Revenue Code with primary definitional elements and a calculable formula. It is m…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.