Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
This resolution uses the Congressional Review Act to disapprove an FTC rule called the Negative Option Rule that was published at 89 Fed. Reg. 90476 on November 15, 2024. The rule was intended to regulate "negative option" marketing and automatic renewal practices that charge consumers unless they take action to opt out. If Congress passes this joint resolution and the President signs it, the rule is nullified and has no force or effect. The law also prevents the agency from issuing a new rule that is substantially the same without new legislation from Congress.
The Federal Trade Commission's "Negative Option Rule" published at 89 Fed. Reg. 90476 (November 15, 2024).
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Under the Congressional Review Act, disapproval resolutions are considered under expedited procedures and are not subject to a filibuster in the Senate, so they can pass with a simple majority in each chamber; they must then be presented to the President for signature or veto.
This joint resolution invokes the Congressional Review Act (chapter 8 of title 5, U.S. Code) to disapprove and nullify the Federal Trade Commission rule titled "Negative Option Rule" (89 Fed.
Reg. 90476, Nov. 15, 2024).
If enacted, the resolution declares that the FTC rule "shall have no force or effect." The resolution contains no amendments, conditions, or alternative regulatory language; it only seeks to void the specified FTC rule.
On content alone the bill is narrow and administratively simple, which makes it a type of measure that can clear one chamber relatively easily. However, the political dynamics that determine whether a CRA disapproval becomes law are concentrated in the Senate (procedural hurdles, potential need for a supermajority) and in the interaction with the White House (the enrolled joint resolution still requires the President's signature or an overridden veto). Because the resolution nullifies a single consumer-protection rule and lacks compromise features, it is moderately plausible but faces significant uncertainty in the Senate (and possibly at the signing stage).
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a narrowly focused Congressional Review Act disapproval that clearly identifies the targeted rule and prescribes the standard legal effect. It provides the essential, legally operative language required for a CRA resolution but omits explanatory findings, fiscal context, and any additional oversight or implementation detail.
Whether nullifying the FTC rule primarily reduces regulatory burden (conservative view) or removes important consumer protections (liberal view).
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Whether nullifying the FTC rule primarily reduces regulatory burden (conservative view) or removes important consumer protections (liberal view).
A mainstream liberal/left-leaning observer would likely oppose this resolution because it seeks to overturn an FTC consumer-protection rule.
They would view the negative option rule as a measure to protect consumers from deceptive or automatic-charging practices, and see congressional disapproval as a rollback of those protections.
Because the joint resolution contains no replacement protections or targeted fixes, they would be concerned about leaving consumers exposed.
A centrist/moderate would approach the resolution pragmatically and want more detail before committing.
They would recognize congressional oversight and the need to curb regulatory overreach, but also the importance of protecting consumers from unfair billing practices.
Lacking the text of the FTC rule in the resolution, they would likely be undecided and call for additional information: the rule’s costs on businesses, consumer benefits, empirical evidence, and whether a narrower legislative fix could address any overreach.
A mainstream conservative would likely view the resolution positively as a restoration of protections against regulatory overreach.
They would emphasize that the CRA is an appropriate tool for Congress to check an agency rule that imposes burdens on businesses or exceeds statutory authority.
Conservatives may argue that the FTC rule (as referenced) likely contains prescriptive obligations that could hamper commerce, and that nullifying it prevents undue costs and preserves market freedom.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone the bill is narrow and administratively simple, which makes it a type of measure that can clear one chamber relatively easily. However, the political dynamics that determine whether a CRA disapproval becomes law are concentrated in the Senate (procedural hurdles, potential need for a supermajority) and in the interaction with the White House (the enrolled joint resolution still requires the President's signature or an overridden veto). Because the resolution nullifies a single consumer-protection rule and lacks compromise features, it is moderately plausible but faces significant uncertainty in the Senate (and possibly at the signing stage).
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Whether nullifying the FTC rule primarily reduces regulatory burden (conservative view) or removes important consumer protections (liberal…
On content alone the bill is narrow and administratively simple, which makes it a type of measure that can clear one chamber relatively eas…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a narrowly focused Congressional Review Act disapproval that clearly identifies the targeted rule and prescribes the standard legal effect. It provides the essenti…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.