Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 179.
This resolution uses the Congressional Review Act to reject a recent agency action. It declares that the specified Bureau of Land Management record of decision and plan amendment will have no force or effect. Under this process, Congress can nullify a recently issued federal rule and bar the agency from issuing a substantially similar rule in the future unless Congress passes new legislation. If enacted, the disapproval is binding and removes the rule from effect.
The Miles City Field Office Record of Decision and Approved Resource Management Plan Amendment is being disapproved.
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Under the CRA, Congress uses an expedited process: the Senate's consideration of a disapproval measure cannot be filibustered and requires a simple majority to pass. The joint resolution still must be passed by both chambers and be signed by the President (or have a veto overridden) to take effect.
This joint resolution would use the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 8) to disapprove and nullify the Bureau of Land Management’s Miles City Field Office Record of Decision and Approved Resource Management Plan Amendment (issued November 20, 2024).
The resolution cites a Government Accountability Office opinion (dated June 25, 2025) concluding that that Record of Decision and plan amendment qualifies as a rule under the Congressional Review Act.
If enacted, the resolution declares the specified BLM rule to have no force or effect.
On content alone the measure is procedurally simple and narrowly focused (which helps passage prospects), and it does not create fiscal obligations. However, it directly nullifies a specific federal land-management decision that likely has organized supporters and opponents; it lacks compromise features and depends on coherent majority support in both chambers plus concurrence from the executive branch (or overcoming a veto). Those political factors, which are not visible in the text, make the measure only moderately likely to become law based on historical patterns for similar resolutions.
Relative to its intended legislative type (a substantive repeal of a specific administrative rule via the Congressional Review Act), this resolution is concise and functionally sufficient: it names the rule, cites the governing statutory vehicle, and declares the rule void. It lacks fiscal commentary, contingency language, and oversight provisions.
Whether congressional disapproval is an appropriate remedy versus remanding or revising the agency decision (centrist seeks narrower fixes; conservatives favor disapproval).
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Whether congressional disapproval is an appropriate remedy versus remanding or revising the agency decision (centrist seeks narrower fixes; conservatives favor disapproval).
A mainstream liberal/left-leaning person would be cautious or skeptical of this resolution because it uses Congress to overturn an administrative land‑management decision.
Because the bill text does not describe the content of the Miles City ROD/RMP amendment, this persona would withhold firm judgment about outcomes but would be concerned about a precedent of congressional disapproval being used to block agency actions that protect public lands or implement environmental safeguards.
They would also worry that the move politicizes technical land-management decisions and could weaken scientific or public‑participation processes at BLM.
A pragmatic centrist would treat this resolution as a procedural use of the Congressional Review Act that demands scrutiny of both the GAO finding and the substantive effects of the Miles City RMP amendment.
They would be focused on whether the disapproval corrects a clear legal or procedural defect and on practical impacts for land users, local economies, and conservation.
Without the RMP’s substance in the text, a centrist would be ambivalent — open to disapproval if the rule is procedurally flawed or demonstrably harmful, but wary of sweeping use of CRA that creates instability.
A mainstream conservative would generally favor congressional disapproval under the CRA as a check on perceived agency overreach and to restore legislative control over significant federal land‑management decisions.
They would view the GAO determination that the ROD/RMP is a rule as a procedural justification for using the CRA.
Many conservatives also prioritize local control, multiple‑use access to public lands, and constraints on federal administrative expansion, and so would likely see this resolution as appropriate oversight.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
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On content alone the measure is procedurally simple and narrowly focused (which helps passage prospects), and it does not create fiscal obligations. However, it directly nullifies a specific federal land-management decision that likely has organized supporters and opponents; it lacks compromise features and depends on coherent majority support in both chambers plus concurrence from the executive branch (or overcoming a veto). Those political factors, which are not visible in the text, make the measure only moderately likely to become law based on historical patterns for similar resolutions.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Whether congressional disapproval is an appropriate remedy versus remanding or revising the agency decision (centrist seeks narrower fixes;…
On content alone the measure is procedurally simple and narrowly focused (which helps passage prospects), and it does not create fiscal obl…
Relative to its intended legislative type (a substantive repeal of a specific administrative rule via the Congressional Review Act), this resolution is concise and functionally sufficient: it names the rule, cites the g…
Go beyond the headline summary with full stakeholder mapping, legislative design analysis, passage barriers, and lens-by-lens tradeoff breakdowns.