Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
This resolution proposes a change to the U.S. Constitution that would require Members of Congress to forfeit their pay during any lapse in appropriations caused by Congress failing to pass funding. If both chambers of Congress approve this joint resolution and three-fourths of state legislatures ratify it, the amendment would become part of the Constitution. The amendment also directs forfeited pay to the Treasury to reduce federal debt and gives Congress authority to enforce the amendment by passing laws.
A constitutional amendment must be approved by the required supermajority in both the Senate and the House and is then sent to the states for ratification; it is not sent to the President. Ratification requires approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures (or state conventions if Congress specifies).
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would require Members of Congress to forfeit and not receive any compensation for any period when there is a lapse in appropriations caused by failure to enact regular or continuing appropriations for one or more federal agencies or departments.
Amounts forfeited would be transferred to the general fund of the Treasury to be used to reduce the Federal debt.
Congress would have authority to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation.
On content alone the measure is narrow, administrable, and has rhetorical appeal as an accountability reform, but it proposes a constitutional amendment — a deliberately high threshold path requiring two-thirds of both chambers and ratification by three-fourths of the states. Because it directly reduces compensation for the very actors who must approve it and lacks compromise mechanisms or exemptions, historically similar structural amendments have low probability of reaching and completing the full amendment process.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a concise constitutional rule that would materially change legal obligations (forfeiture of congressional compensation during lapses in appropriations) and appropriately delegates implementation to Congress, but it leaves many practical and technical details unspecified.
Degree of support — all three personas are generally supportive but conservatives are strongest, centrists pragmatic, and progressives cautiously supportive.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Degree of support — all three personas are generally supportive but conservatives are strongest, centrists pragmatic, and progressives cautiously supportive.
A mainstream progressive would likely view the amendment as a popular accountability measure that could reduce the political acceptability of government shutdowns, but would also worry about unintended effects on legislative bargaining and minority-party leverage.
They would note the provision directs forfeited pay to the Treasury to reduce the federal debt, which aligns with fiscal responsibility, yet question whether the amendment could create incentives to pass short-term continuing resolutions or otherwise undercut substantive policy outcomes.
The progressive would also be attentive to how enforcement legislation is written to avoid loopholes and to protect staff and constituent services.
A pragmatic centrist would likely regard this amendment as a commonsense accountability tool with broad public appeal but would be cautious about constitutionalizing a procedural budget mechanism.
They would appreciate the incentive structure to reduce shutdowns while emphasizing the need for precise statutory implementation to avoid perverse incentives (like routine short-term continuing resolutions) or legal uncertainty.
The centrist would look for narrowly tailored enforcement rules and cost estimates before committing full support.
A mainstream conservative would generally support the amendment as a mechanism to hold lawmakers accountable for failing to fund the government and to impose a penalty that could reduce the political incentive for shutdowns.
They would view transferring forfeited pay to debt reduction as fiscally responsible and politically popular.
Conservatives may also favor a constitutional amendment because previous statutory fixes have not reliably prevented shutdowns, though they would want enforcement to be strict and not easily avoided.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone the measure is narrow, administrable, and has rhetorical appeal as an accountability reform, but it proposes a constitutional amendment — a deliberately high threshold path requiring two-thirds of both chambers and ratification by three-fourths of the states. Because it directly reduces compensation for the very actors who must approve it and lacks compromise mechanisms or exemptions, historically similar structural amendments have low probability of reaching and completing the full amendment process.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Degree of support — all three personas are generally supportive but conservatives are strongest, centrists pragmatic, and progressives caut…
On content alone the measure is narrow, administrable, and has rhetorical appeal as an accountability reform, but it proposes a constitutio…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill presents a concise constitutional rule that would materially change legal obligations (forfeiture of congressional compensation during lapses in appropriations) and a…
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