Congress Member Profile|U.S. Senator|Democrat|Rhode Island
Sheldon Whitehouse
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Voting Record — 789
Yes31%
No65%
Present0%
Not Voting4%
Party align95%
Cross-party5%
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Senate District (Statewide)
U.S. Census Bureau boundary data.
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Sheldon Whitehouse
U.S. SenatorDemocratRhode Island
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Sheldon's ATmosphere Activity
20 recent posts · 88 sponsored · 218 cosponsored
Recent ATmosphere posts, sponsorships, and cosponsorships.
The Schemers have much more to fear, and they know it.
As best I can tell, KBJ is being true to herself, true to her oath, and true to her native land. That’s my take, anyway. (P.S. Harlan was alone in dissent, too, and that aged well.)
The far right is undeniably twitchy, because the participants know the Scheme better than anyone. The points Jackson has made so far about patterns and preferences and predisposition likely only touch the surface of a far deeper problem.
If the Emperor has no clothes, and chooses to walk down the Main Street of the city, it may very well be indecorous to call him out as buck naked. But the real wrong in that scenario is in the naked parade down Main Street, not in the call that points the nakedness out.
To rely on another’s “collegiality” to hide one’s own mischief isn’t fair play.
If it would be unseemly for a gentleman or gentlelady to call out a colleague for having their hand, or their friends’ hands, in the gentleman’s or gentlelady’s pocket, is it not worse to have put that hand in the pocket in the first place?
Jackson may have come to the Court sharing those obvious concerns. If so, she had a running start on noticing the mischief. She may choose not to look at the Men in Black Neuralyzer and disappear the awareness she brought of the mischief at the Court. Nor should she.
Their discretion, decorum and “collegiality” have limits — and should have limits. Truth and candor are also judicial virtues.
KBJ comes from the district and circuit courts, where many judges are concerned about the mischief surrounding the Supreme Court. It’s happening in plain view. Judges are not idiots.
What if a colleague uses your “collegiality” as a strategic tactic, like a pick on a basketball court, deliberately for advantage? Surely, the coin of collegiality has a flip-side obligation to behave in such a way that your colleague’s collegiality is never abused.
She has begun looking at interests, and motives, and connections. She’s begun to point behind the curtain at what “collegiality” obscures.
Justice Jackson has begun looking at patterns, and noticing what types of parties tend to win, and which tend to lose. She has noticed procedural discrepancies.
These are all unseemly things to discuss, indecorous, and not at all “collegial.” But if they are true, should they not be discussed? How much mischief happening in plain view in the courthouse should a justice ignore in the interest of “collegiality”?
What if flotillas of secretly-funded amici curiae appear before the Court and sing in conspicuous harmony, and win with conspicuous frequency, and the Court makes little to no effort to enforce its own rules about amicus disclosure about their financing and coordination?
What if we are in a time when novel judicial doctrines, reverse-engineered for happy results for certain special interests, are grown and fertilized in special-interest-funded legal hothouses and then make their way through the Court to become the law of the land?
What if we are in a time when favored parties and litigants win victories with statistically astounding regularity? And justices are feted at organizational fund-raising dinners where those statistically-astounding winners convene?
And sheltered behind the weakest ethics review of any court in the land whenever the gifts program is challenged?
What if we are in a time when a billionaires’ gifts program has given certain justices ‘lifestyles of the rich and famous’ and they have reciprocated with favorable rulings?
What if we are in a time when a billionaire-funded scheme has spent decades trying to pack the Court with billionaire-agreeable justices, so as to “capture” the Court in the sense of “regulatory capture” or “agency capture” — and what if the billionaires have finally succeeded?
But what if we’re not in ordinary times?
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Voting History789 total votesExpandCollapse
Voting History
789 total votes
Recent roll calls with party-majority context so it is easier to scan how this member tends to vote.
| Date | Bill | Question | Position | Party Maj | Align? | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-07-15 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (50-46) |
| 2025-07-15 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (52-46) |
| 2025-07-15 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (52-47) |
| 2025-07-15 | — | Confirm nominee | YES | NO | ✕↔ | Nomination Confirmed (69-30) |
| 2025-07-14 | — | End debate | YES | NO | ✕↔ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (60-28) |
| 2025-07-14 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (46-42) |
| 2025-07-10 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (50-45) |
| 2025-07-10 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (51-43) |
| 2025-07-10 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (50-45) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (49-45) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (49-46) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (51-44) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (53-43) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (51-46) |
| 2025-07-09 | — | Confirm nominee | NO | NO | ✓ | Nomination Confirmed (54-43) |
| 2025-07-08 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (47-42) |
| 2025-07-08 | — | End debate | NO | NO | ✓ | Cloture Motion Agreed to (47-41) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Final passage | NO | NO | ✓ | Bill Passed (50-50, Vice President of the United States, voted Yea) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | NO | NO | ✓ | Amendment Agreed to (50-50, Vice President of the United States, voted Yea) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Bennet Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | NO | NO | ✓ | Amendment Agreed to (50-50, Vice President of the United States, voted Yea) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (45-55) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (50-50) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (50-50) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (49-51) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (48-52) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Agreed to (99-1) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (48-52) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (47-53, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | NO | NO | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (21-79) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Warnock Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (48-51) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Vote on amendment | YES | YES | ✓ | Amendment Rejected (50-50) |
| 2025-07-01 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Wyden Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-07-01 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive All Applicable Budgetary Discipline Re: Kennedy Amdt. No. 2775) | NO | NO | ✓ | Motion Rejected (54-46, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-07-01 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 302(f) of the CBA Re: Collins Amdt. No. 2812) | NO | NO | ✓ | Motion Rejected (22-78, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 425(a)(2) of the CBA re: H.R. 1) | NO | NO | ✓ | Motion Agreed to (51-48, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Padilla Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 313(b)(1)(A) of the Congressional Budget Act Re: Kennedy Amdt. No. 2772 ) | NO | YES | ✕↔ | Motion Rejected (42-58, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Schiff Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Duckworth Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (49-51) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Hassan Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (48-52) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Gallego Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Finance with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Blumenthal Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Armed Services with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-06-30 | H.R. 1 (119th) | Motion (Kaine Motion to Commit H.R. 1 to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs with Instructions) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 313 (b)(1)(D) of the CBA Re: Amdt. No. 2401) | NO | NO | ✓ | Motion Rejected (53-47, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 302(F) of the CBA Re: Murray Amdt. No. 2771) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (49-51, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 313(b)(1)(D) of the Congressional Budget Act Re: Merkley Amdt. No. 2446) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 313(b)(1)(D) of the CBA Re: Cornyn Amdt. No. 2705) | NO | NO | ✓ | Motion Rejected (56-44, 3/5 majority required) |
| 2025-06-30 | — | Motion (Motion to Waive Section 302(F) of the CBA Re: Amdt. No. 2414) | YES | YES | ✓ | Motion Rejected (47-53, 3/5 majority required) |
Alignment stats consider only votes where a clear yes/no majority existed for the legislator's party. Cross-party marks divergence where the vote matched the opposite party majority. ↔ indicates cross-party divergence.