Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
The Wall Street Tax Act of 2025 would add a new subchapter to the Internal Revenue Code imposing a tax on ‘‘covered transactions’’ in securities and many derivatives. The tax rate phases up from 0.02% per transaction in 2026 to 0.1% per transaction starting in 2030, and the tax base is generally the fair market value of the security (or the payment amount for derivatives).
Overall desirability: liberals generally supportive (tax on finance), conservatives broadly opposed (market harm), centrists split conditional on safeguards.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clear substantive tax enactment that is legally detailed in scope and definitions but omits fiscal/resourcing detail and several operational collection and enforcement specifics.
The Wall Street Tax Act of 2025 would add a new subchapter to the Internal Revenue Code imposing a tax on ‘‘covered transactions’’ in securities and many derivatives.
The tax rate phases up from 0.02% per transaction in 2026 to 0.1% per transaction starting in 2030, and the tax base is generally the fair market value of the security (or the payment amount for derivatives).
The tax applies to trades on U.S. qualified exchanges and to transactions involving U.S. persons, with exchanges and brokers generally responsible for collection and special rules for off-exchange and controlled foreign corporation activity.
On content alone the bill creates a large, economy-wide change (a new financial transaction tax) with clear revenue aims but also substantial potential market effects and concentrated, well-resourced opposition from financial firms and intermediaries. Although the bill includes phased implementation and some exemptions, the combination of high ideological salience, fiscal/regulatory footprint, and cross-cutting technical issues makes it unlikely to clear both chambers and be enacted without significant modification, offsets, or narrow tailoring.
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clear substantive tax enactment that is legally detailed in scope and definitions but omits fiscal/resourcing detail and several operational collection and enforcement specifics.
Overall desirability: liberals generally supportive (tax on finance), conservatives broadly opposed (market harm), centrists split conditional on safeguards.
These are examples from the analysis, not a ranked list of the most-affected groups.
Overall desirability: liberals generally supportive (tax on finance), conservatives broadly opposed (market harm), centrists split conditional on safeguards.
A mainstream liberal is likely to view this bill favorably as a targeted tax on high-volume financial trading that can generate federal revenue and discourage speculative, short-term trading.
They would note that the bill explicitly covers many derivatives and includes provisions to treat controlled foreign corporations as U.S. persons, which helps prevent basic avoidance.
They would expect the tax to be progressive in effect if revenues are used for social programs or to strengthen financial oversight, while appreciating exemptions for initial issuances.
A moderate/centrist would see plausible public-finance and market-stabilization rationales for a modest financial transactions tax but would also be wary of economic and implementation tradeoffs.
They would want careful evidence that the tax raises enough revenue net of behavioral responses and does not meaningfully increase costs for ordinary investors, pension funds, municipalities, or U.S. competitiveness.
They would value the bill’s phase-in schedule and broad scope but would press for targeted mitigations, clear rulemaking, and thoughtful transition measures.
A mainstream conservative is likely to oppose the bill on grounds that it imposes new costs on capital markets, increases government reach into financial activity, and risks driving trading activity offshore or raising costs for ordinary investors.
They would emphasize the tax as a form of market-distorting regulation that could harm liquidity and raise costs for businesses that rely on efficient capital markets.
They would be skeptical that the coordination and anti-avoidance provisions will prevent significant economic and competitive harms.
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Reached or meaningfully advanced
Still ahead
Still ahead
Still ahead
On content alone the bill creates a large, economy-wide change (a new financial transaction tax) with clear revenue aims but also substantial potential market effects and concentrated, well-resourced opposition from financial firms and intermediaries. Although the bill includes phased implementation and some exemptions, the combination of high ideological salience, fiscal/regulatory footprint, and cross-cutting technical issues makes it unlikely to clear both chambers and be enacted without significant modification, offsets, or narrow tailoring.
The bill has not accumulated any surfaced votes yet.
Overall desirability: liberals generally supportive (tax on finance), conservatives broadly opposed (market harm), centrists split conditio…
On content alone the bill creates a large, economy-wide change (a new financial transaction tax) with clear revenue aims but also substanti…
Relative to its intended legislative type, this bill is a clear substantive tax enactment that is legally detailed in scope and definitions but omits fiscal/resourcing detail and several operational collection and enfor…
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